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Cert to Ark. S. Ct. 
(Dudl~ for maj., 
Purtle, diss.) 
State/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs contend that the Arkansas Supreme Court 
erred in holding that social security and veterans' benefits may 
be included in a prisoner's "estate" for purposes of a state law 
requiring contributions by pr is one rs with estates to pay the 
costs of their incarceration. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: The state attorney general 
filed this suit seeking to obtain reimbursement for the state for 
maintaining petrs as inmates. The action was filed pursuant to 
the "State Prison Inmate Care and Custody Reimbursement Act," 
- 2 -
Ark.Stat.Ann. §§46-1701 to 1707, which provides that when an 
inmate is found to have an estate the ~tate may have a guardian 
appointed and the estate may be liable to the state for the 
inmate's room, board, clothing, and medical expenses. "Estate" 
is defined as including payments from the Social Security 
Administration and other pensions or retirement benefits. Petr 
Bennett's estate consisted solely of funds he received from 
social Security retirement benefits, and petr Shelton's estate 
consisted of funds he received from the Veterans' Administration 
for disability. Bennett complained that subjecting his estate to 
liability violates the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 407 that "none 
of the moneys paid • shall be subject to • • • levy or other 
legal process. Shelton complained that the action violated a 
similar provision concerning veterans' benefits, 38 u.s.c. § 
3101 (a) (Payments "shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, 
and shall not be 1 iable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or 
under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or 
after receipt by the beneficiary.") The tc found these benefits 
subject to the Arkansas provision and ordered part of the estates 
to be paid to the state. 
The Ark. s. Ct. affirmed. If the federal and state acts 
were in conflict, the Supremacy Clause would dictate our result. 
There is, however, no conflict, because the federal statutes 
contain an implied exception to the exemption from legal process 
when the state provides for the 
beneficiary of these benefits. 
Davis, 616 F.2d 828 (CAS 1980). 
care and maintenance of a 
See Department of Health v. 
.As explained in Davis, the 
( 
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purpose of the benefits is to provide for the care and 
maintenance of the beneficiaries. The exemption from creditors ' 
actions evidences a clear legislative philosophy of precluding 
beneficiaries from diverting the benefits away from the goal. 
The benefits are paid for the purpose of assuring the 
beneficiaries' care and maintenance, and the state seeks to do 
nothing more than that here. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare 
Board, 409 u.s. 413 (1979), is not to the contrary. We agree 
with the distinction of Philpott drawn by CAS in Davis, 616 F.2d, 
at 830 ("Philpott is different from this case, however, since 
there the welfare recipient was capable, at least in part, of 
providing for his own care, and the state was not acting in loco 
parentis, as it is here. The beneficiary in Philpott was merely 
receiving assistance in providing for himself.) The Court of 
Appeals of frtichigan has also followed this approach. Department 
of Correction v. Brown, 125 Mich. App. 620, 337 N.W.2d 23 (1983). 
Justice Purtle dissented, arguing that the Arkansas law 
conflicted with the federal statutes and that Philpott was 
controlling. "In enacting these laws the United States Congress 
unquestionably, by the clear and express language of the 
statutes, intended the recipients to be the owners of such funds 
and that no one, not even judgment creditors, could take these 
funds away from the beneficiaries." Petn.App. at 6. 
3. CONTENTIONS: This case marks the second time this term 
that the Court must tell the Arkansas Supreme Court to follow the 
Supremacy Clause. See Rose v. Arkansas State Pol ice, 107 S. Ct. 
334 (1986). The Social Security and veterans' statutes clearly 
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prohibit the use of any kind of legal process to seize benefits . 
There ace no "implied exceptions" to this pronibition, a:-·,d 0:-dy 
Congress can change the effect of these nona ttachr::ent s~a ': '..:-:c::s. 
See Hisgui erdo v . Hisguierdo, 4 39 u.s . 575 (1979); ?hil;xr:-: , 
supra. The federal statutes permit of no exceptions or different 
standards that would allow persons act.ir.g ir-, loco Darer.t i.s -:o 
attach these benefits. The implications of ·t'he decisior. !:lelc-.. 
are significant, because more states are -:o a-::-:ack 
federally protected benefits, especially where, as here , t~e 
beneficiaries are vulnerable. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petrs make a colorab:e clai~ ~~a-; t~e 
Arkansas Supreme Court erred in finding an exception t o -;he 
federal statutes, which are on their face absol~te. The 
exception found by the Arkansas court is a creation of the CAS i~ 
Davis and was applied in that case to allow the state t o ~se 
benefits for one who had been declared an incompetent. Tl.io 
states--Michigan and Arkansas--have now applied this exception t o 
uphold the application of statutes including the benefits as pa~t 
of a prisoner's obligation to pay for his incarceration. 
Consideration of the issue is thus not widespread, and there is 
no split for the Court to resolve, so denial might be appropriate 
at this time. Nevertheless, the decisions cited by petrs seem to 
conflict with the plain language of the statutes and with the 
tenor of Philpott. Accordingly, 
I recommend CFR. 
Response waived. 
IFP status: Petr Bennett's affidavit establishes that IFP 
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status is proper. Petr Shelton, according to his attorney , 
cannot be found . The attorney has attached to the petn Shelton ' s 
answers to interrogatories in an attempt to establish IFP status. 
IF use of these interrogatories is appropriate, they demonstrate 
that Shelton may proceed IFP. 
February 11, 1987 Leitch opn in petn 
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